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Abstract
This paper compares two approaches that aim to explain the lagged and persistent behavior
of inflation and output after a variation in the interest rate. Two variants that produce iner-
tia are added to a baseline DSGE model of sticky prices: 1) a lagged inflation indexation rule
along with habit formation; and 2) sticky information applied to firms, workers, and house-
holds. The rival models are then confronted to a monetary SVAR using U.S. data in order
to estimate the rates of inflation indexation, habit formation, price rigidities, information
stickiness, and the monetary policy rule parameters. It is shown that the sticky information
model has a modest advantage at fitting inflation than the lagged inflation index. model with
habits. For output, the opposite is true. These differences are consistent in the robustness
analysis, but they are not big enough to imply a significant statistical difference in terms of
the goodness of fit of each model. In addition, the results suggest that sticky information
may replace entirely sticky prices as a explanation of price setting behavior, but the latter
might not apply to wages. Finally, the analysis find that information stickiness should be
pervasive (i.e., applied to households, firms, and workers) in order to replicate the responses
of aggregate variables to a shock in monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
In the last 20 years, a large volume of the monetary economics literature has focus on explaining
the effects of monetary policy on inflation and output dynamics. A few of the findings are the
are listed as follows: first, output and inflation take a few quarters to react to a variation in
the nominal interest rate; and second, the reaction of inflation is lagging behind the reaction
of output. These stylized facts have been documented in several studies, such as Christiano et
al. (1999, 2005) for the U.S., Mojon and Peersman (2003) and Sousa and Zaghini (2008) for
Europe, and Wang and Wen (2007) for several OECD countries.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) have documented the in-
ability of pure sticky-price models in replicating the aforementioned regularities. As a result,
dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have followed two main strategies to
explain the observed delayed responses to monetary policy. On the one hand, the works of Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999) inspired the inclusion of a lagged inflation-indexation rule for those firms
and workers who might find themselves unable to reoptimize their prices and wages in a certain
period. For output, it is normally assumed that households form habits in their consumption
patterns, along with other real rigidities on investment. These devices have proved to be suc-
cessful at replicating the inertia of inflation and output after a shock to monetary policy (see
Christiano et al., 2005; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; or Smets and Wouters, 2007). On the other
hand, the work of Mankiw and Reis (2002) has popularized the view that these ad hoc devices
may be replaced by environments in which information flows slowly throughout the population.
The aim of this paper is to confront these two main strands of the literature in terms of their
predicted effects after a shock to monetary policy and to ask which one delivers a better fit in
terms of the dynamics responses of inflation and output. There are several papers that tackle a
similar question, such as Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido and Nelson (2005), Knotek (2006), Korenok and
Swanson (2007), Kiley (2007), Trabandt (2007), Wang and Wen (2007), Dupor et al. (2009),
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009), Coibion (2010), among others. The answers of these authors
are mixed, as are their analytical methods. Some find that a sticky price model with lagged
inflation indexation and habits performs better than a pure sticky information model. Some
others argue that a model containing both sticky prices and sticky information performs better
in terms of inflation. Some papers focus only on the fit of the Phillips curve, while others pay
attention to the aggregate dynamics coming from a general equilibrium approach. Remarkably,
all of these papers only consider the case of inattentive firms while assuming that workers and
consumers have full information.
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Mankiw and Reis (2006) argue, in contrast, that a pervasive slow diffusion of information (or
that all agents are subject to information frictions) is a necessary feature of the model to fit
different moments of the data.1 At least to my knowledge, only the works of Mankiw and Reis
(2006, 2007), and Reis (2009) consider inattentive firms, workers, and households. Nevertheless,
these studies do not compare the performance of the pervasive sticky information model to a
standard model with sticky prices and lagged inflation indexation as well as habits.
The contribution of the present paper is threefold. First, it studies the case of a model allowing
for nominal rigidities and pervasive information stickiness, i.e. dual-stickiness, and it compares it
to the case of nominal rigidities with lagged inflation indexation and habits. Second, by allowing
a dual-stickiness model, the paper asks whether the data support the coexistence between sticky
information and sticky prices, or whether the former may entirely replace the latter. And third,
the paper provides further evidence of the necessity of having pervasive information stickiness
in order to explain the persistent responses of inflation and output to a shock in monetary policy.
In contrast with previous studies, the present analysis focuses directly on the dynamic responses
of a set of macroeconomic variables to a shock in monetary policy, which are estimated with a
monetary SVAR using U.S. data for the period 1960(1)-2007(2). The approach employed herein
follows the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE) proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and used extensively in papers by Altig et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2005), Boivin and Gian-
noni (2006), and others. The purpose is to match some selected model-based impulse response
functions (IRFs) with their empirical SVAR counterparts in order to estimate the parameters
that create persistence and hump-shaped patterns in each of the model economies. Here, the
selected variables are output, inflation, wage inflation, and the target interest rate. The ad-
vantage of this technique over a single-equation analysis is that it obtains information from the
entire economic structure of the model economy, which dynamics can be analyzed for different
response horizons.
The strategy of the analysis is as follows. First, a baseline model containing price and wage
rigidities is assumed. Then, in the first variant, a lagged inflation-indexation rule for firms and
workers is added, along with habit formation for households. The second variant adds sticky in-
formation to firms, workers, and households. Therefore, both variants share similar preferences,
technology, and a potential role for nominal rigidities. Second, the IRFs of each variant are
used in the MDE estimation in order to find the parameters that are mainly responsible for the
aggregate dynamics in each model. These parameters refer to the degree of inflation indexation,
1These moments are the following: 1) Inflation tend to rise jointly with output during booms; 2) Real wages
are smoother than output; and 3 Real variables respond gradually to macroeconomic shocks.
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habit formation, rates of updating information, rates of price and wage reoptimization, and the
parameters of the monetary policy rule. The estimation procedure involves a bootstrapping
method that aims to provide critical values for statistical inference and which allows one to
screen possible problems of identification. The later is also useful to assess the goodness of fit of
each model by computing the bootstrapped distribution of the root-mean-squared error (RMSE)
concerning the fit of each model variant. Finally, a robustness analysis is performed, assuming
different calibrations, output gap measures, and an alternative ordering in the SVAR.
The results are as follows. First, the sticky information model is slightly better than the lagged
inflation-indexation model with respect to inflation, while for output, the opposite is true. These
differences, although consistent throughout the robustness analysis, do not seem to be statically
significant in terms of the RMSE statistic. In terms of the dynamics of wage inflation and the
nominal interest rate, both models do equally well. Also, a remarkable finding, is that the es-
timated parameters of the monetary policy rule are quite similar in both models. Second, the
estimated version of the sticky information model suggests that inattentive firms may replace
entirely sticky prices as an explanation of price setting behavior. The latter is consistent with
the findings of Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Willis (2007), who use microdata to
argue that individual prices are in a way flexible, but they react to old information. For wages,
the conclusion is less robust. Although the sticky information model estimates the degree of
wage rigidities equal to zero, the large scope of its confidence interval does not allow the conclu-
sion that wages are allowed to move (be reoptimized) each period. This finding might presume
a problem of weakly identification concerning wage rigidities in the sticky information model.
And third, the assumption that only firms are inattentive, while workers and households have
full information, is completely rejected by the data. In addition, assuming that either firms or
workers are attentive and thus that information stickiness is not pervasive, results in a poor
goodness of fit of the model. This finding suggests that the best environment to study sticky
information models is the one in which all type of agents face information frictions.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model with nominal and
real rigidities, and adds indexation and habits, or sticky information. Section 3 details the
econometric approach. Section 4 and 5 discusses the estimation results and perform a robustness
analysis. Section 6 discusses some dimensions that might help to discriminate between one of
the two models. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered.
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2 Model variants
The model presented below shares several common features when compared to the state-of-art
literature, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), or
Mankiw and Reis (2007).
2.1 The baseline
2.1.1 Final good sector
A perfectly competitive firm produces a homogenous good, dt, that can be either consumed, yt,
or be used as a production input in the intermediate-good sector, qt. Aggregate demand for the
homogenous good is thus given by dt = yt+ qt. The firm produces dt by combining a continuum
of intermediate goods, indexed by ς ∈ [0, 1], using the technology suggested by Kimball (1995),
and used by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) or Woodford (2003):∫ 1
0
G
(
dt(ς)
dt
)
dς = 1, (1)
whereG(·) is a increasing and strictly concave function, that satisfies the normalization G(1) = 1;
dt(ς) is the input of intermediate good ς. The standard Dixit-Stiglitz specification is contained
in Kimball’s technology by setting G(z) = z(θp−1)/θp , with z = d(ς)/d and θp > 1 as the elasticity
of substitution among input goods. The general form used by Kimball offers some advantages,
as having a variable θp, which, as it will be noted below, constitutes a source of strategic com-
plementarities among intermediate-good producers. In this context, θp(z) ≡ −
zG′(z)
G′′(z) .
The aggregate good firm chooses dt and dt(ς) to maximize its profits
Ptdt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(ς)dt(ς)
subject to (1), where Pt and Pt(ς) are the nominal price of the aggregate good and the interme-
diate input ς, respectively. The demand for input dt(ς) is thus given by:
dt(ς) = dtG
′−1
(
Pt(ς)
Pt
λt
)
, (2)
where λt =
∫ 1
0 G(dt(u)/dt) · (dt(u)/dt)du, and G
′−1 represents the inverse function of G′. The
general price index, Pt, is implicitly determined by the zero profits condition of the aggregate
goof firm.
2.1.2 Intermediate good
Each intermediate good dt(ς) is produced by a single monopolistic firm. Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1995) propose a gross-output production function of the form
dt(ς) = min
{
F (nt(ς))
1− sq
,
qt(ς)
sq
}
, (3)
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where F (·) is an increasing and concave function, nt(ς) is the composite labor input, to be de-
fined later, qt(ς) are raw materials employed by firm ς, and sq ∈ [0, 1] determines the coefficients
of input requirements. The convenience of considering raw materials in this fixed-proportions
technology relies on the sources of strategic complementarities (see below) that this device im-
plements. The real cost function is thus denoted by S(dt(ς)) = wtF
−1(dt(ς)(1 − sq)) + sqdt(ς),
where wt ≡Wt/Pt denotes aggregate real wages.
Monopolistic firms face nominal rigidities, as it is assumed that in each and every period prices
can be reoptimized with a fixed probability 1− αp. If firm ς is unable to re-optimize in period
T , then its price is updated according to a rule-of-thumb of the form PT (ς) = (1 + δ
p
t,T )Pt(ς),
where t < T denotes the period that the last reoptimization took place. The term (1+ δpt,T ) will
be properly defined once the two inertia environments that this paper analyzes, namely lagged
inflation indexation and sticky information, are described.
Let P ⋆t (ς) denote the price of firm ς if it is allowed to reoptimize in period t, and d
⋆
t,T (ς) the time
T output of this firm. Therefore P ⋆t (ς) is chosen in order to maximize the present discounted
sum of profit streams, based on firm ς’s available information, i.e.,
max
Pt(ς)
EΓt(ς)
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−tϕT
[(
(1 + δpt,T )Pt(ς)
PT
)
d⋆t,T (ς)− S
(
d⋆t,T (ς)
)]
subject to d⋆t,T (ς) = dtG
′−1
(
(1 + δpt,T )Pt(ς)
PT
λT
)
where βT−tϕT is the stochastic discount factor, and EΓt(ς) represents the expectations operator
conditional to the information contained in the set Γt(ς).
2.1.3 Households
Households are composed of two agents: a consumer and a worker. The former chooses con-
sumption and bond holdings, while the latter uses his monopolistic power to set his wage, as it
is assumed that every worker has a unique labor type. As a result, labor is traded in specific
labor markets. Also, we allow consumers and workers to differ in the information they possess
to make their decisions. This assumption is a model device that may give flexibility to match
wage inflation and output inertia with higher accuracy.2 On the other hand, it could be argued
that the information needed for wagesetting might be highly influenced for specific structures,
such as unions, whereas consumers are not influenced by the same factors.
2See Mankiw and Reis (2006) and (2007).
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All households earn utility from consumption and leisure, which is represented by the instanta-
neous utility function
U (g(ct(υ), ct−1(υ)))− V (ht(̟)).
Consumer types and worker types are indexed by υ and ̟, respectively, in the [0, 1] interval;
ct(υ) and ht(̟) denote consumption and labor; U is increasing and concave; V is increasing
and convex; and, finally, g is a function that may allow for the existence of habit formation in
consumption. The time t budget constraint of the household, in real terms, is given by:
ct(υ) +
bt(υ)
1 + it
+ τ t(υ) ≤
Wt(̟)
Pt
ht(̟) +
bt−1(υ)
1 + πt
+ divt, (4)
where bt(υ) denotes real bonds acquired in period t and maturing in period t+1; it is the nominal
interest rate; τ t(υ) denotes real lump-sum government transfers as well as state-contingent
securities that ensure that all households begin with the same wealth at time t;3 Wt(̟) is the
nominal wage rate earned by type-̟ labor; and divt represents real profits redistributed by
monopolistic firms. Consumers choose a plan for current and future consumption and real bond
holdings in order to maximize
EΥt(υ)
∞∑
T=t
βT−tU (g(cT (υ), cT−1(υ)))
subject to (4) and no-Ponzi schemes. β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and EΥt(υ)
represents the expectations operator conditional to the information set Υt(υ).
Workers sell their labor input to a perfect competitive labor intermediary. The latter produces a
single labor input using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Because the worker is a monopolist supplier,
he will take into account the labor intermediary’s demand when setting his wage. Additionally,
the worker faces wage rigidities, as he might not always be able to reoptimize its wage. As in
the case of intermediate producers, it is assumed that in each and every period wages can be
reoptimized with a fixed probability 1 − αw. If worker ̟ is unable to reoptimize in period T ,
then its wage is updated according to a rule-of-thumb of the form WT (̟) = (1 + δ
w
t,T )Wt(̟),
where t < T denotes the period of the last reoptimization. Let W ⋆t (̟) denote the wage of
worker ̟ if it is allowed to reoptimize in period t, and let h⋆t,T (̟) denote its time T labor input.
Therefore, W ⋆t (̟) is chosen in order to maximize
EΩt(̟)
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
ΛT (υ)
(
1 + δwt,T
)
W ⋆t (̟)
WT
h⋆t,T (̟)− V (h
⋆
t,T (̟))
]
3The literature in the field points out that, in principle, households might be different with respect to consump-
tion and asset holdings, as they can work different amounts and charge different wage rates. As Woodford (1996)
and Erceg et al. (2000) show, adding this assumption ensures that, in equilibrium, households are homogenous
in consumption and asset holdings.
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subject to h⋆t,T (̟) =
((
1 + δwt,T
)
W ⋆t (ς)
WT
)−θw
hT .
where ht is the aggregate labor input, θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among different
labor types, Λt(υ) is the type-υ’s marginal utility of wealth, and EΩt(̟) is the expectations
operator conditional to the information set Ωt(̟).
2.1.4 Government and Equilibrium
There is no active role for the fiscal authority, while the central bank follows a typical Taylor
rule of the form
ıˆt = aππˆt + ay yˆt + et (5)
et = ρeet−1 + σννt. (6)
where πt is the inflation rate of period t, ρe ∈ [0, 1), σν > 0, and νt is an iid random variable with
mean zero and unitary variance. The monetary policy is shown in terms of percentage deviation
from the steady state. It delivers interest-rate inertia from persistent shocks from the baseline
rule, denoted by et, which consists of the discretionary part of monetary policy. Although it is
not a general case, real determinacy is often achieved in this environment when aπ > 1, which
is an assumption that we follow closely when computing the dynamics of the model.
The equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a set of prices {Pt, Pt(ς), Wt,Wt(̟), it}
and a set of quantities {dt, qt, yt, ct(υ), bt(υ), nt(ς), ht, ht(̟)}, for all ς, υ, ̟, such as all markets
clear at all times. Notice that in equilibrium yt =
∫ 1
0 ct(υ)dυ, ht =
∫ 1
0 nt(ς)dς,
∫ 1
0 bt(υ)dυ = 0,
and dt = yt +
∫ 1
0 qt(ς)dς.
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2.2 Lagged inflation indexation and habit formation
Sticky prices on their own are unable to bring inertia in inflation and output (see Fuhrer and
Moore, 1995; Chari et al., 2000; or Fuhrer, 2006). For this reason, I consider two different devices
that have proven to add this fundamental empirical characteristic in the baseline model. The
first alternative assumes that firms and workers that were unable to re-optimize their prices and
wages in period T update them according to a rule-of-thumb of the formXT (̺) = (1+δ
x
t,T )Xt(̺),
for X ∈ {P,W} and ̺ ∈ {ς,̟} where t < T denotes the period of last re-optimization, and
1 + δxt,T =
{ ∏T−1
j=t (1 + π)
1−γbx(1 + πj)
γbx , if T > t;
1, otherwise.
4Notice that in equilibrium, the percentage deviations of aggregate consumption, aggregate raw materials, and
aggregat demand are equal. That is, yˆt = dˆt = qˆt.
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where π represents the steady state inflation, and γbx ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ {p,w} measures the degree
of indexation to past inflation values. When γbp = 1, then firms index their prices to reflect last
period inflation and thus PT (ς) = (1 + πt−1)PT−1(ς). The same logic is used for workers.
In the case of consumers, we allow for the existence of habit formation by setting
g (ct(υ), ct−1(υ)) = ct(υ)− γ
b
hct−1(υ)
where γbh ∈ [0, 1). In order to close the description of this environment, we need to make some
assumptions about the information set of economic agents. The dynamics of the model should
be consistent with the short-term restrictions that are used later in the empirical SVAR that
identifies shocks in monetary policy. It is thus assumed that consumption, prices or wages do
not react contemporaneously to innovations in the interest rate. In contrast, the demand for
bonds does change as a result of policy innovations. We can justify this structure by assuming
that the goods and labor markets open before the central bank makes a decision, while the
financial market opens just after. As a result, Γt(ς) = Υt(υ) = Ωt(̟) = It−1 for all ς , υ, ̟ at
the time consumption, prices and wages are decided, where It−1 reflect all available information
concerning shocks and innovations up to time t− 1. In contrast, Υt(υ) = It when the demand
for bonds is chosen. Because all types of agents share the same preferences and production
technologies, all agents reoptimizing in period t will choose the same values for their decision
variables. We can thus drop type indexes and simply state that P ⋆t (υ) = P
⋆
t , W
⋆
t (υ) = W
⋆
t ,
Λt(υ) = Λt, and ct(υ) = ct = yt.
The dynamics of the model economy, stated as percentage deviations from the steady state, are
described by the monetary rule contained in (5) and (6), plus the F.O.C. of consumption and
bond holdings,
0 = σ˜Et−1
{
βγbhyˆt+1 − [1 + β(γ
b
h)
2]yˆt + γ
b
hyˆt−1
}
− Et−1Λˆt (7)
Λˆt = EtΛˆt+1 + (ˆıt − Etπˆt+1), (8)
where pˆ⋆t = Pˆ
⋆
t − Pˆt; wˆ
⋆
t = Wˆ
⋆
t − Wˆ
′; βx = βαx, with x ∈ {p,w}; and σ˜ =
σ
(1−βγb
h
)(1−γb
h
)
with
σ ≡ −U
′′(c)c
U ′(c) as the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; plus the Phillips curves
corresponding to prices and wages,
pˆ⋆t = Et−1
{
(1− βp)ξp(wˆt + ωpyˆt) + βp(pˆ
⋆
t+1 + πˆt+1 − γ
b
pπˆt)
}
(9)
wˆ⋆t = Et−1{(1 − βw)ξw(ωwφYˆt − Λˆt − wˆt) + βw(wˆ
⋆
t+1 + πˆ
w
t+1 − γ
b
wπˆt)}, (10)
where ωp ≡ −
F ′′(n)n
F ′(n)
F (n)
F ′(n)n is the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with regard to
output; ω−1w ≡
V ′(h)
V ′′(h)h is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply; φ
−1 ≡ F
′(n)n
F (n) is the elasticity of
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intermediate goods w.r.t to labor; finally, ξp and ξw include parameters governing the sources
of real rigidities and strategic complementarities among price- and wage-setters, respectively.
Specifically,
ξp =
1
θp(1)ωp + (1 + θp(1)ǫµ)/(1− µp(1)sq)
, and ξw =
1
θwωw + 1
.
The terms θp(1)ωp and θwωw included in the above expressions are due to the assumption of
specific factor markets, where θp(z) > 1 is the elasticity of demand of intermediate goods eval-
uated at z ≡ d(ς)/d = 1.
The parameter ǫµ ≡ µ
′
p(1)/µp(1) indicates the elasticity of the desired intermediate producer
markup, µp(z), evaluated at the steady state. If ǫµ > 0 (and thus θp(z) is decreasing in z), a
trade-off occurs among price setters who would like to cut their prices in order to increase their
relative sales. As Kimball (1995) shows, if this increase leads to a less-elastic demand, then
their desire markup will rise along with their marginal income. Therefore, in the presence of a
decreasing demand elasticity, monopolistic suppliers would like to change their prices by less, as
there is a compensation resulting from an increasing markup.
The term µp(1)sq appears due to the input-output structure of the economy described by the
gross-output production function introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). These au-
thors argue that adding a share of primary factor inputs represents a closer approximation of real
production technologies. The latter is of special importance in models where there is imperfect
competition and prices do not co-move perfectly with marginal costs. Notably, a positive mate-
rial goods share lowers the reaction of intermediate prices to movements in sales by decreasing
the value of ξp.
5
In sum, the real rigidities described above might be useful to explain the lagged and persistent
reaction of prices and wages observed after a shock in monetary policy. To conclude, the zero-
profit condition of the final-good producer and the labor intermediary imply that the percentage
deviations of the general price and the nominal wage indexes can be written as
Pˆt = (1− αp)Pˆ
⋆
t + αpPˆt−1 + αpγ
b
pπˆt−1 (11)
Wˆt = (1− αw)Wˆ
⋆
t + αpWˆt−1 + αwγ
b
wπˆt−1, (12)
while the steady-state percentage deviations of inflation and wage inflation are denoted by
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 and πˆ
w
t = Wˆt − Wˆt−1, respectively.
5For further insights about these sources of strategic complementarities, see Woodford (2003).
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2.3 Pervasive information stickiness
The second alternative to including inertia in the model consists of adding sticky information
in households, firms, and workers. In this model variant, I assume that both kinds of stickiness,
on information and on prices and wages, are present in the economy. The latter enable us to
test whether the data support the coexistence of these two rigidities in the economy, which is
a critical difference with the environments studied by Khan and Zhu (2006), Mankiw and Reis
(2007), or Kiley (2008), among others. Therefore, sticky information only replaces inflation
indexation and habit formation as a source for macroeconomic persistence.
In this economy, the rule-of-thumb that workers and firms use to update wages and prices in
period T takes the simple form XT (̺) = (1 + π)Xt(̺), for X ∈ {P,W} and ̺ ∈ {ς,̟} where
t < T denotes the period of the last reoptimization. That is, agents update their prices and
wages according to steady-state inflation. Also, habit formation is not longer allowed for con-
sumers, implying that g(ct(υ), ct−1(υ)) = ct(υ). Consequently, the former statements assume
that γbw, γ
b
p, and γ
b
h equal zero.
In contrast, the information structure is much more complex in this environment. Mankiw and
Reis (2006) argue that a full-fledged DSGE model should present slow information diffusion
pervasively, that is, that all agents in the economy face information frictions. It is thus assumed
that at each and every period, every agent in the economy has a probability 1− γsix of collecting
the newest information available, for x ∈ {p,w, h} denoting prices, wages, and consumption,
respectively. However, I maintain the assumption that consumption, prices, and wages are de-
cided prior to the decision of the central bank, while financial markets open after. Therefore,
a proportion 1 − γsih of consumers decide their consumption bundles with the information con-
tained in set It−1; (1−γ
si
h )γ
si
h use the information of set It−2; (1−γ
si
h )(γ
si
h )
2 use the information
contained in It−3, and so on. Naturally, a similar structure applies for workers and firms using
their relevant updating information probabilities.
One complication that arises in sticky-information environments is that solving for the equilib-
rium dynamics requires taking into account the sequence of delayed expectations of endogenous
variables, which in this case is infinite. Some authors, such as Trabandt (2007), solve the
problem by truncating the number of lags present in expectations. Notice, however, that the
structure of the model economy allows us to restrict our attention to the particular decisions of
the most-informed agents. The reason is that all agents reoptimizing in period t and sharing
the same information will choose similar values for their decision variables, as all agents have
similar preferences, production technologies, and access to financial markets. This property is
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especially useful when one wants to solve the model through undetermined coefficients.
Formally, if Xkt (̺) for X ∈ {c, P
⋆,W ⋆} and ̺ ∈ {υ, ς,̟} represent the optimal consumption,
price or wage chosen by an agent with information set It−k, for k ≥ 1, then, as a consequence of
similar preferences and technologies, we can drop type indexes and simply state that ckt = Et−kct,
P ⋆kt = Et−kP
⋆
t , and W
⋆k
t = Et−kW
⋆
t for all k > 1, where, by convention, we set Xt ≡ X
1
t for
X ∈ {c, P ⋆,W ⋆}. Therefore, the dynamics of this model economy, as stated in terms of the
most informed agents and as percentage deviations from the steady state, are described by the
monetary rule contained in (5) and (6), plus the F.O.C. of consumption and bond holdings of
the most attentive consumer,
0 = −σEt−1cˆt −Et−1Λˆt (13)
Λˆt = EtΛˆt+1 + (ˆıt − Etπˆt+1), (14)
plus the Phillips curves of the most attentive firm and worker,
pˆ⋆t = Et−1
{
(1− βp)ξp(wˆt + ωpYˆt) + βp(pˆ
⋆
t+1 + πˆt+1)
}
(15)
wˆ⋆t = Et−1{(1 − βw)ξw(ωwφYˆt − Λˆt − wˆt) + βw(wˆ
⋆
t+1 + πˆ
w
t+1)}, (16)
where pˆ⋆t = Pˆ
⋆
t − Pˆt and wˆ
⋆
t = Wˆ
⋆
t − Wˆt, plus the aggregate behavior of all consumers, price-,
and wage-setters,
yˆt = (1− γ
si
h )
∞∑
k=0
(γsih )
kEt−k−1cˆt (17)
Pˆt = (1− αp)(1 − γ
si
p )
∞∑
k=0
(γsip )
kEt−k−1Pˆ
⋆
t + αpPˆt−1 (18)
Wˆt = (1− αw)(1 − γ
si
w)
∞∑
k=0
(γsiw)
kEt−k−1Wˆ
⋆
t + αpWˆt−1. (19)
The last three expressions are the components that add intrinsic inertia to the model economy.
Also note that both sticky prices and sticky information coexist as long as αp and γ
si
p are
greater than zero. The equilibrium dynamics are solved using the algorithm employed by Lieb
(2009), which is a refinement of the principles provided by Meyer-Ghode (2010). The approach
employed by these authors is a method based on undetermined coefficients, which uses the
infinite moving-average (MA) representation of the model economy.
3 Econometric methodology
This section details the monetary SVAR and the impulse response functions (IRFs) that will be
used to estimate the two DSGE models described above. It also presents the minimum distance
estimation (MDE) approach.
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3.1 The Monetary SVAR and U.S. data
The econometric analysis starts by characterizing the actual economy’s response to a monetary
policy shock. As it is common in the literature, this analysis can be done by estimating a
monetary SVAR along the lines proposed by Christiano et al. (1999, 2005) or Boivin and
Giannoni (2006).6 The details of this identification strategy are provided in the above papers.
Here, the main ingredients are described. We consider a structural SVAR of the form:
A0Zt = A1Zt−1 + · · · +AℓZt−ℓ + ηt,
In order to identify the structural shocks to monetary policy νt, a short-run identification strat-
egy using a Cholesky decomposition can be employed. If so, the data vector Zt is decomposed
according to Zt =
(
Z ′1,t, ıˆt, Z
′
2,t
)′
. Z1,t is a n1 × 1 vector composed of variables that do not
respond contemporaneously to the monetary shock νt, and are thus assumed to be predeter-
mined. In contrast, Z2,t is a n2 × 1 vector containing variables that are allowed to respond
contemporaneously to νt.
The data used for the SVAR come from the U.S. Non-Farm Business sector over the sample
period 1960(1)-2007(2). In addition to the federal funds rate, ıˆt, the variables used for estima-
tion are the output gap measured as the linearly detrended logarithm of GDP per capita,7 yˆt,
the quarterly growth rate of GDP’s implicit price deflator, πˆt, and the quarterly growth rate of
nominal hourly compensation, or wage inflation, πˆwt . In addition, two “information” variables
are included. First, the quarterly growth rate of the logarithm of the Commodity Research Bu-
reau (CRB) price index of sensitive commodities, πˆct , is considered to mitigate the so-called price
puzzle.8 Second, the growth rate of M2, ξˆt, is included to exploit some potential information
involved in money growth.9 In order to implement the monetary policy shock’s identification
strategy outlined above, we set Z1,t = (yˆt, πˆt, πˆ
w
t , πˆ
c
t)
′ and Z2,t = ξˆt. All time series are de-
meaned, such as they can be interpreted as percent deviations from their long-term equilibrium.
The optimal lag length ℓ is determined by minimizing the Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
In the empirical analysis, ℓ is found that be equal to 4.
6See Christiano et al. (1996); and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) for other examples of identifying
strategies.
7The civilian, non-institutional population over 16 was used as a measure of population.
8This practice is a fairly standard in the literature. See Sims (1992), Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano et al.
(1996, 1999).
9The data were extracted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the FREDII database, and the CRB.
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3.2 Estimation strategy
The model parameters are divided into two groups, ψ1 and ψ2. The first group is composed
by parameters governing preferences, technology, and sources of strategic complementarity, i.e.
ψ1 ≡ {β, σ, θp, θw, ωp, ωw, ǫµ, φ, sq}. β is set equal to 0.99, implying a steady-state annualized
real interest rate of 4 per cent. We set σ = ωw = 1, implying a logarithmic utility for con-
sumption and a unitary Frisch labor supply elasticity, as considered by Altig et al. (2005) and
Christiano et al. (2005). φ equals 1.33, denoting a steady-state share of labor income of 62.5
per cent, after correcting for the markup. If the intermediate firm production function is a
Cobb-Douglas, then ωp equals φ− 1. The share of material goods in gross output, sq, is set to
50 per cent since it may represent a good approximation for the U.S. economy, as suggested by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). We set θp = 6, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Christiano et al. (2005), which implies a price markup of 20 per cent. The markup elasticity
to relative demand, ǫµ, is set to 1, as used by Woodford (2003). Finally, θw is set to 21 as done
by Christiano et al. (2005), implying a wage markup of 5 per cent.
The second group of model parameters includes the sources of intrinsic and extrinsic inertia
carried out either by lagged inflation indexation or sticky information. It also includes the
degree of price and wage rigidities as well as the parameters of the monetary policy rule and
the policy shock; that is, ψ2 ≡
{
γp, γw, γh, αp, αw, aπ, ay, ρe, σe
}
. The partition between cali-
brated and estimating parameters responds to the difficulty that may be faced in identifying
some parameters. For instance, estimating ǫµ, θp, and αp together (or, equivalently, θw and
αw) raises issues in their identification, as these parameters appear in a single reduced-form
coefficient in the Phillips curve. In terms of Canova and Sala (2009), the lack of reduced-form
parameters raises the problem of partial identification. The latter has been noticed in practice
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach (2003), or Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004). Nonetheless, the impact of different calibrations of these parameters is assessed in the
robustness analysis. Other parameters, such as β, φ, or sq, are fixed in order to reflect aggregate
values empirically observed in the data.
The parameters ψ2 are estimated by minimizing a measure of the distance between the empirical
responses of key aggregate variables and their model counterparts.10 More precisely, attention
is focused on the responses of vector Xt, which is a subset of Zt, and includes output, inflation,
wage inflation, and the fed funds rate, that is, Xt = (yˆt, πˆt, πˆ
w
t , ıˆt). Define h (ψ2) as the mapping
from ψ2 to the model impulse response functions to a monetary shock. Next, let θk denote the
vector of responses to a shock in monetary policy at horizon k ≥ 0, as implied by the SVAR.
10See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach (2003), Altig et al. (2005), Giannoni and Woodford
(2004), Christiano et al. (2005), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
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Then, the object to match is θ = vec([θ0, θ1, . . . , θK ])
′, where K is the selected horizon.11 The
estimate of ψ2 is obtained by solving
ψˆ2 = arg min
ψ2∈Ψ
JT ,
where
JT = (h(ψ2)− θˆT )VT (h(ψ2)− θˆT )
′,
Ψ contains the admissible values for the parameters contained in ψ2, θˆT is an estimate of θ, T is
the sample size, and VT is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of θ along the diagonal.
The choice of the weighting matrix has some specific advantages. As Christiano et al. (2005)
note, it ensures that the model’s impulse responses lie as much as possible within the confidence
interval of the SVAR impulse responses. The disadvantage of using VT relies on the distribution
properties of the JT statistic. Becasue VT is not the optimal weighting matrix, it is quite
probable that the asymptotic distribution of JT will not be a χ
2 with dim(θ)-dim(ψ2) degrees of
freedom, under the null hypothesis that JT equals zero (or that the model approximates perfectly
the SVAR impulse responses). Fe`ve et al. (2009) solve this problem using a bootstrapping
method that computes the empirical distribution of JT , which enables one to test the null of
JT = 0. In the lines of Hall and Horowitz (1996), Fe`ve et al.’s method proposes the generation
of N bootstrap samples of the SVAR and recomputes the relevant impulse responses. For each
replication of impulse responses, set as θi, the parameters contained in ψ2 are re-estimated by
solving
ψi2 = arg min
ψ2∈Ψ
J i, (20)
where
J i = (h(ψ2)− θ
i − µˆT )VT (h(ψ2)− θ
i − µˆT )
′,
and µˆT ≡ h(ψˆ2)− θˆT is used to recenter the bootstrapped analog of the moment condition. Hall
and Horowitz point out that, without recentering, the bootstrap could implement a moment
condition that is not held in the bootstrapped sample. For instance, in the case of minimum
distance estimation, not recentering may increase the probability of accepting the null hypoth-
esis of JT = 0, when it should be actually rejected. The method gives us the bootstrapped
distribution of J i that we can use for statistical inference. In the present analysis, N is set to
1000.
The estimation method described above, as many others, can be subject to parameter identifica-
tion issues, which in the case of the MDE estimation have been highlighted by Canova and Sala
(2009). Even though the choice of the calibrated parameters tackles a well-identified problem of
11Because the model described embeds the same timing restrictions used for the SVAR, we can exclude from θ
and h (ψ2) the elements of each response function that are zero by assumption.
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partial identification, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the estimating parameters
might encounter a problem of weak identification. One way to assess whether this possibility
exists is by looking at the bootstrapped distribution of the estimating parameters, ψi2, computed
in equation 20. This distribution will give us an idea of how precisely are computed the esti-
mating parameters, and whether we can use the distribution for inference purposes. Further,
we can perform robustness exercises where not only the estimating parameters are subject to
different calibrations, but also to a different measure of the output gap, or a different ordering
of variables in the monetary SVAR.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Responses of U.S. data to a monetary policy shock
The impulse response functions of output, inflation, wage inflation, and the fed funds to a
contractionary shock in monetary policy are reported in Figure 1, with K = 45. The plain
line is the SVAR’s point estimates of the impulse responses, while the dash lines indicate the
90 per cent confidence interval, using Runkle (1987)’s bootstrap method with 10,000 replications.
These findings are in line with the results reported by Christiano et al. (1999, 2005), and other
authors. Output exhibits a significant persistence and a hump-shaped pattern, peaking after six
quarters. The response of inflation suggest a small, but insignificant, price-puzzle in the very
short run. Inflation shows a hump-shaped profile, lagging behind output, and peaking during
the third year after the shock. The response of wage inflation is qualitatively similar to inflation,
although slightly lagging behind. Finally, the federal funds rate increases immediately and then
gradually declines to the point where it eventually crosses the x-axis. The evidence provided by
Christiano et al. (1999, 2005), replicated here, remains the most-cited reference characterizing
two stylized facts of aggregate data: first, output and inflation take some quarters to respond
to a variation in the interest rate; and second, the response of inflation lags behind the one of
output. These features are those that the models described in Section 2 try to replicate.12
4.2 Baseline estimations
The baseline estimations for the lagged inflation indexation and the sticky price models are pre-
sented in the first row of tables 1 and 2, respectively. Accordingly, the JT statistic shows that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that JT = 0 for both the sticky information model (hereafter,
SI) and the lagged inflation indexation model with habits (hereafter, LII) models, so the data do
not reject either of the two models. The model-based impulse responses are depicted in figure 2,
12New studies point out to the importance of a varying inflation target as a determinant of inflation persistence
(see Cogley, Primeceri, and Sargent, 2009). This approach might have important implications on how we should
model inflation dynamics, but this point is left for further research.
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where we can see that both model variants do well at replicating the empirical impulse responses
embedded by the SVAR. Tables 1 and 2 provide the standard deviation in parenthesis, and the
90 per cent confidence interval for the point estimates. In few cases, though, theses measures
are not provided, as the empirical distributions of the estimated parameters, drawn from the
bootstrapped method, display a sizable density at either one or two of the extremes of the as-
sumed parameter space. This phenomenon can be a signal of weak identification, as the 90 per
cent confidence interval may become uninformative about of the size of the estimating parameter.
Curiously, this phenomenon happens when the point estimate of a parameter is located at one
of the extremes, such as the degree of price and wage stickiness in the SI model, the degree of
inflation indexation in the LII model, or the output coefficient in the Taylor rule for both models.
When it comes to the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule, the point estimate in both
models is higher than its lower bound. However, because the latter is constrained to be equal to
1.001, in order to ensure determinacy, the bootstrapped distribution of the inflation coefficient
is also fat tails. In order to extract the most of information from the bootstrapped distribution
of these parameters, I compute an interval starting at one of the extremes of the parameter
space and ending at its 80 percentile, thus showing the 80 per cent mass of the bootstrapped
distribution. If this pseudo-confidence interval is still large or uninformative about the value of
a coefficient, than we can suspect that we have a problem of weak identification.
Finally, the horizon for estimation is chosen to be equal to 45 periods. The rationale for a
relatively long horizon is that the estimation method is fed with more information about the
behavior of the aggregate dynamics. The results for different horizons, available upon request,
shows that for small horizons (5 to 20), the estimating parameters are somehow unstable and
the models fit is low; while for larger horizons (from 30 to 60), the estimating parameters and
the model fit do not really vary. Next, the baseline estimation of the LII model is discussed
first, followed by the discussion of the SI model.
4.2.1 Lagged inflation indexation.
It will prove most convenient to compare the results obtained here with the most popular and
accepted versions of this model in the literature. The works of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (CEE 2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (BG 2006) are particularly useful, as they both
use an econometric method that is substantially similar to the one proposed herein. Also, the
analysis of Smets and Wouters (SW 2007) is appealing because they use a full-information esti-
mation method that takes into account a broad range of macroeconomic shocks.
Table 1, row 1, shows that the habit persistence parameter, γbh, is equal to 0.81, which is some-
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what higher than the value found by CEE or SW but lower than the estimation of BG. In fact,
the estimates of these authors are contained within the 90 per cent confidence interval of γbh,
which is quite above its lower bound. This result confirms previous results that consumption
inertia is an important factor that helps to explain aggregate fluctuations.
The model is characterized by full inflation indexation in both prices and wages, as it can be
seen by the point estimates of γbp and γ
b
w. This result is also found by BG (2006), and is quite
consistent in the bootstrapped estimations, where 80 per cent of the times γbp was estimated
between 0.78 and 1, whereas γbw varied between 0.64 and 1. The present estimations show that
lagged inflation indexation is a very important device for this model to replicate the impulse
responses of inflation and output, and is line with the findings of Fuhrer (2006).
When it turns to the degree of nominal rigidities, table 1 shows that αbp and α
b
w amount to 0.74
and 0.84, respectively. The model thus predicts that price contracts last on average 3.8 quarters,
while for wages the number is 6.2 quarters. BG find a similar prediction for prices (from 4 to 5
quarters), and Fe`ve et al. (2007) with respect to wages (7 quarters). These point estimates are
slightly higher than those found by CEE and SW, which amount to 3 quarters for prices, and 3
or 4 quarters for wages. The 90 per cent confidence interval for these parameters confirm that
the LII model predicts that both prices and wages are rigid.
One factor that may explain the differences between the CEE and SW results, concerning the
degree of nominal rigidities, is that the results from table 1 come from a model that does not
assume any role for variable capital utilization, as investment does not enter into the economic
dynamics. Interestingly, when CEE remove variable capital utilization or investment adjust-
ment costs from their baseline model, the degree of nominal rigidities substantially increase, and
become similar to the point estimates shown here.13
We conclude the discussion of the LII model with the policy rule and exogenous shock param-
eters. The point estimate for the inflation coefficient is 1.41, and it was estimated between its
lower bound of 1 and 2.46 about 80 per cent of the times. Note that one important limitation
of this analysis is its apparent inability to draw meaningful insights about the size of aπ, as the
estimation period covers at least two different regimes of monetary policy management, namely,
the pre- and post-Volcker periods.14 In the present analysis, however, I explicitly chose not break
13Intuitively, by allowing the rate of capital utilization to vary, the volatility of marginal costs is reduced and,
everything else equal, so does inflation volatility. As a result, CEE and SW do not need a high degree of nominal
rigidities or high indexation to maintain an important degree of inflation inertia (or irresponsiveness); prices are
thus allowed to be more flexible.
14It has been widely documented that a policy change had effectively taken place in October 1979, when the
Fed chairman, Paul Volcker, implemented the policy that presumably led to the period of disinflation and stability
of the 1980s.
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the sample into sub-samples, given that the SVAR in the period 1980-2007 exhibits a number of
pathologies.15 Therefore, I follow the strategy of CEE (1999, 2005) and adopt a longer sample.
Interestingly, however, SW find that aπ is equal to 1.6 during 1966-1979, and to 1.8 during 1984-
2004. According to their estimations, the Federal Reserve certainly reacted more aggressively to
contain inflation in the second sub-sample, but the change was not tremendous. This evidence
is also confirmed by Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
Less appealing is the point estimate of the output gap coefficient, which hit the zero bound and
that took values between 0 and 0.37 about eighty percent of the time. BG also found that the
output gap coefficient is not significant in their baseline results, and SW recognizes that the
Federal Reserve do not appears to react strongly to the output gap level.
The size of the monetary policy shock (σe) matches the impact effect of its SVAR counterpart
quite well, as can be appreciated by figure 2. Further, the shock is quite persistent (ρe = 0.92),
which implies that the interest rate would reflect an important degree of smoothing.16
To recap, the LII model presented here requires inflation indexation in order to match the
dynamics of the monetary SVAR. It also predicts that price and wage contracts last 4 and 6
quarters on average, respectively. Finally, the estimations shown herein do not differ substan-
tially from previous studies in the literature, either those estimated through minimum distance
estimation (like CEE or BG), or those that consider full-information methods (like SW).
4.2.2 Sticky information
The point estimates are presented in table 2, row 1. When it turns to the degree of informa-
tion stickiness, the results of table 2 suggest that households (γsih ) update information every 10
quarters on average (i.e. 1/ [1− .90]). Notice that the lower bound of the 90 per cent confidence
interval of γsih lies well above zero, which implies that the assumption that households update
information only infrequently is not ruled out by the data. The value of γsip suggests that firms
update information every 3 quarters on average, whereas for workers (γsiw) the number is 4.8
quarters. The 90 percent confidence interval for these measures range from 2 to 4.5 quarters
15For example, output persistently rises after a contractionary shock in monetary policy. In addition, the
estimated IRFs are not precisely estimated, implying that estimating DSGE parameters in order to replicate
these responses is meaningless. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the point raised by Sims (1998) that SVARs
estimated on a short time series can produce very erratic IRFs. In addition, Sims and Zha (2006) have found
more evidence for stable dynamics with unstable disturbance variances than for clear changes in model dynamics.
See also Leeper and Roush (2003) and Rudebusch and Wu (2004).
16Notice that an explicit term for policy inertia was excluded from the Taylor rule in equation (5). The latter
follows recent studies that point out a predominant role for persistent monetary shocks, rather than a high degree
of policy inertia, in explaining the dynamics of certain U.S. macro variables (see Rudebusch, 2006; or Carrillo et
al., 2007).
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for firms, and from 2.5 to 6.2 quarters for workers. Let us compare these results with those of
previous studies.
The number of papers that aim to estimate different versions of the SI model lately substantially
increased. Table 4 presents a selective review of these works. Although the variety of quantita-
tive methods is rich, which offers several perspectives from where the results of table 2 can be
compared, only a few works have a general equilibrium approach, and even fewer consider the
case of pervasive stickiness. Among the latter, only Mankiw and Reis (MR 2006 and 2007) and
Reis (2009) estimate the values of γsih , γ
si
p , and γ
si
w using a general-equilibrium framework. In
addition, at least to my knowledge, the results presented in table 2 are for the first time delivered
by a method that directly focuses on the aggregate effects of a shock to monetary policy.
The vast majority of papers cited on table 4 assume sticky information only on price decisions.
As such, we can see that the firms’ estimated elapsed time for information updating ranges from
1.4 to 6.7 quarters. The point estimate of γsip and its confidence interval lie well within this
range. Further, the point estimate of γsiw in table 2 is very close to the one found by MR (2007),
in which they perform a Bayesian estimation over a very similar sample period. Finally, the
point estimate of γsih is similar to the results of Reis (2009), who uses Bayesian estimation over
the post-1986 data. Notice that there seems to be a regularity in the estimations that consider
pervasive stickiness: firms and workers tend to be more attentive than households.
The sticky information model depicted in Section 2.3 is specially designed to answer the question
of whether pervasive sticky information can replace entirely sticky prices and wages. Remem-
ber that this model variant allows for dual stickiness, thus enabling both kinds of rigidities to
interact with one another in a general-equilibrium framework. The results presented in table 2
suggest that sticky information is the relevant friction concerning at least price-setting behavior.
Both point estimates of αsip and α
si
w equal zero. Further, α
si
p was located between 0 and 0.32
about eighty percent of the time, according to the bootstrapped estimations. The SI model thus
interprets that prices are more flexible than the LII model does. For wages, the result is less
robust. Following table 2, the distribution of αsiw has 80 percent of its mass between the support
values of 0 and 0.75. Even though the latter do not contains the point estimate αbw according
to the LII model, the large scope of the interval does not allow one to conclude that wages are
fully flexible according the SI model.
Recent studies, such as Knotek (2006), Dupor et al. (2009), or Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2009) have also asked if sticky information can replace entirely sticky prices. They do not
study the influence of sticky information over wage rigidities, as they assume that workers are
fully attentive. The results of these authors suggested that a model containing both sticky prices
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and sticky information better fits the data than assuming sticky information in isolation. Their
estimation of αsip is greater than zero and significant. This result contrasts the findings of table
2. One factor that may explain these conflicting conclusions is the framework in which the
same question was asked. Dupor et al. (2009) and Knotek (2006) both use partial equilibrium
analysis. Therefore, their estimations might miss important information coming from the cross-
equations restriction of a full-fledged DSGE model. To verify this hypothesis, table 2, row 8,
display the estimation results of the SI model when only firms are subject to sticky information
(thus γsih = γ
si
w = 0, by assumption). Although the point estimate of γ
si
h is quite similar to the
baseline, and the estimate of αsip is greater than zero, this variant of the SI model is rejected by
the data at the 5 per cent significance level. The p-value of the associated JT statistic is equal
to 0.02. Therefore, cross-equation restrictions are important. The robustness analysis discusses
the dimensions in which this variant of the SI model fails.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009) use a complete DSGE model, in which sticky-price firms
cohabit with sticky-information firms. The discrepancy in our conclusions might perhaps be ex-
plained by the following. The authors do not consider any wages rigidities, which may represent
a determinant factor to explain macroeconomic persistence, as pointed out by Christiano et al.
(2005). The robustness analysis summarizes the case of the SI model with attentive workers,
where it is shown that the fit of the model is inferior to the baseline case.17
Finally, the parameters concerning the policy rule according to the SI model are examined.
Here, replacing lagged inflation indexation with pervasive information stickiness does not sig-
nificantly alter the size of the policy rule parameters or the properties of the monetary policy
shock. Accordingly, the nominal interest rate will show a sizable degree of smoothing due to
high persistent shocks. It also reacts in a more then a one-to-one basis to changes in inflation
and does not appear to be affected by the output gap. Interestingly, Reis (2009), when esti-
mating a pure version of the SI model, found similar results concerning the output gap coefficient.
4.2.3 Goodness of fit
In order to evaluate the degree of accuracy of the LII and SI models, I compute the root-mean-
squared error (RMSE) between the model-based IRFs and the SVAR IRFs. The RMSE is
17Another reason is that our estimation methodologies are different. The aim of the authors is to match the
serial- and cross-correlations of aggregate variables, and they do so using MDE, while in the present analysis, the
moments to match are the responses of aggregate variables to a monetary policy shock. The accuracy of each
approach can be assessed by asking how well both approaches approximate the behavior of output and inflation
after a shock in monetary policy. The responses obtained by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009) fail to reproduce
the characteristic hump-shaped profile of inflation and output.
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calculated for each of the variables consider for estimation, thus
RMSE(x) =
1
K
K∑
t=1
(ht(ψ2;x)− θˆt(x))
2,
where ht(ψ2;x) and θˆt(x) are the model-based IRF and SVAR IRF for variable x, respectively;
K is the estimating horizon (= 45); and x ∈ {y, π, πw, i} refers to output, inflation, wage in-
flation, and the interest rate. That is, the RMSE(x) is a measure of the distance between the
dynamics predicted by each of the models and the those that are embedded by the SVAR with
respect to variable x. We can use the bootstrapped samples employed in the estimation of the
LII and SI baseline models in order to infer the associated distribution of the RMSE(x) statis-
tic. This method will give us an idea of how different the models are in terms of their ability to
fit the aggregate dynamics of the SVAR. Figure 3 displays the bootstrapped distribution of the
RMSE(x) for each model, according to the baseline estimations of tables 1 and 2. As can be
seen, the distribution of RMSE(πw) and RMSE(i) do not really differ from model to model.
This result indicates that the two models are equally good in explaining wage inflation and
the federal funds rate dynamics. When it comes to output, the mean and mode of RMSE(y)
according to the LII model slightly lean to the right with respect to the SI model. This finding
indicates that, on average, the LII model fits slightly better to output dynamics. Finally, con-
cerning inflation, the opposite is true. The SI model appears to predict the dynamics of inflation
slightly better than the LII model does. Further analysis is provided in the robustness analysis.
5 Robustness analysis
This section re-estimates the LII and SI models for different calibration of certain parameters
concerning preferences and technology. Additionally, an alternative measure of the output gap
is considered, which corresponds to the percentage difference between actual output and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast of potential output, that is, the CBO output gap.
I also consider an alternative ordering in the monetary SVAR. It is assumed that consumers,
workers, and firms make their decisions after the central bank decides the level of the interest
rate. That is, the ordering of matrix Zt in Section 3 changes to Zt =
(
ıˆt, Z
′
1,t, Z
′
2,t
)′
, or the
interest rate moves first. Although the hump-shaped patterns of inflation, wage inflation, and
output are preserved, this identification strategy shows a couple of pathologies. For instance,
output and wage inflation increase on impact after a contractionary shock to monetary policy,
while inflation shows a significant price puzzle in quarters 2 to 4. The latter is difficult to justify
with a theoretical model. However, it is on these adverse circumstances that we might test the
parameter stability of the estimation method concerning the hump-shaped behavior of aggregate
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variables.
For the SI model, I additionally consider different assumptions about information frictions. First,
it is assumed that firms are subject to sticky information, while consumers and workers are fully
attentive. Then, it is assumed that consumers and firms are inattentive, while workers are fully
attentive. And finally, it is assumed that only firms possess full information. The latter has
the intention to verify whether pervasive sticky information is a necessary feature to fit inflation
and output inertia.
Changes in calibration. The results are as follows. Reducing the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, ω−1w from 1 to .1, slightly reduces the degree of wage rigidities in the LII model and
increases the workers’ rate of updating information in the SI model. The latter can be explained
by an increase in the degree of strategic complementarities between wage setters (which is re-
flected by a decrease in the parameter ξw in eq. 10 and 16) which results from a reduction
in the volatility of working hours. While the reduction of the degree of wage rigidities is the
only remarkable change in the LII model, the point estimate of the degree of price rigidities
rises to .44 in the SI model. This is nevertheless substantially lower than the same estimating
parameter of the LII model. Additionally, 80 percent of the mass for this parameter estimate is
located between zero and .47. In addition, the bootstrapped distribution of αsip predicts that the
probability that αsip is smaller or equal than α
b
p, conditional to the calibration where ω
−1
w = .1,
is equal to 93 per cent. The latter means that the SI model predicts that prices are more flexible
than the LII model with more than 10 per cent of significance, when it is assumed that the labor
supply is very inelastic. Note that changes in the parameter θw have similar effects to changes in
ω−1w , as both parameters affect the degree of strategic complementarities between wage setters
similarly.
Reducing the level of risk aversion, σ, from 1 to .5, increases the level of habit persistence in
the LII model and decreases the consumers’ rate of updating information in the SI model. Be-
cause consumers are less risk averse, they are more willing to change consumption today for
consumption in the future. As a consequence, the parameters that create inertia in output are
estimated to be higher. However, the rest of the parameters remain very similar to the baseline
calibration. Finally, assuming values of σ lower than 1 is not common in the literature. For
instance, Christiano et al. (2005) and Mankiw and Reis (2007) set σ equal to 1, whereas Smets
and Wouters (2007) find that σ is 1.4.
Switching off the Kimball aggregator in the final good producers’ technology, or assuming that
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the latter have a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and thus that ǫµ = 0 increases price rigidities in the
LII model, while reduces the firms’ rate of updating information in the SI model. A similar result
is found in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), who find that the frequency of price adjustments
increases when the Kimball technology is assumed. The latter is explained by an increase in the
degree of strategic complementarities between price setters (see definition of ξp in eq. 9 and 15).
The results of the LII and the SI models are in line with this finding. Once again, changes in
the parameters θp(1) or sq have similar effects as changes in ǫµ, as they affect in a similar way
the degree of strategic complementarities between price setters.
Assuming a linear technology in terms of labor in the intermediate sector, that is, φ = 1, reduces
the degree of price rigidities in the LII model and increases the firms’ rate of updating informa-
tion in the SI model. The reason for this changes is that the marginal cost of intermediate firms
becomes less volatile. To see this decreases in volatility, consider that the function F (nt) in eq.
3 is a Cobb-Douglas. The log-linearized version of the latter thus implies that in equilibrium
yˆt = φ
−1nˆt and ωp = φ−1. The baseline calibration assumes decreasing returns to scale on labor,
that is, φ−1 > 1. The latter implies that if output changes by one percent, labor changes by more
than one per cent, which is weighted in the marginal costs in eq. 9 and 15 by the parameter ωp.
By assuming a linear technology, labor changes as much as output, making the marginal costs
less volatile, as reflected by the value of ωp = 0. As a result, a linear technology does not re-
quire much rigidity in prices. Assuming, though, that the labor income’s share of output is equal
to 1 is not very realistic. In any case, other parameters in the model are not significantly affected.
In sum, considering alternative calibrations does not modify the main conclusions of the baseline
estimation.
Alternative SVAR specifications. Changing the measure of output to the CBO output gap
or assuming an alternative ordering in the SVAR does not alter the main conclusions reached
with the baseline estimations. Tables 1 and 2, rows 6 and 7, show the estimating parameters
with the alternative SVAR specifications. As can be observed, the consumption inertia parame-
ters are somewhat increased, whereas the effect for prices and wages is mixed. Nonetheless, the
qualitative findings of the baseline estimation are not modified. The reason behind this result
relies on the aggregate inertia that the alternative SVAR specifications present. Hump-shaped
behavior over a sizable horizon is conserved in those specifications, which allows the estimation
method to choose similar parameters values than in the baseline case.
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Goodness of fit. Concerning the goodness of fit of each model, table 3 displays the mode
and the 90 per cent confidence interval around the median of the RMSE(x) statistic, where
x ∈ {y, π, πw, i} stands for output, inflation, wage inflation, and the fed funds. The original
values are multiplied by 1000, for better readability. The table shows two regularities that can
be clearly observed: first, the LII model systematically achieves a lower RMSE mode in terms
of output; and second, the SI model reaches a lower RMSE mode for inflation. On average, the
mode of RMSE(y) according to the SI model is 25 per cent higher than the same statistic for
the LII model. Similarly, the mode of RMSE(π) according to the SI model is 12 per cent lower
than the same statistic for the LII model. For the fed funds and wage inflation, the difference is
just about 5 per cent. Therefore, the SI model has a modest advantage in explaining inflation
behavior, while the LII model has it for output. Figure 3 shows the bootstrapped distributions
of the RMSE statistics for the baseline model. The picture shows that the distribution for
RMSE(y) and RMSE(π) differ from model to model. The latter is true as well for all the
estimations considered in the robustness analysis.
To answer the question of whether these differences are significant, we can verify whether the 90
per cent confidence interval around the median of RMSE(x) according to one model contains
the mode of RMSE(x) according to the other model. With respect to output, table 3 shows
that, in general, the mode of RMSE(y) according to the LII model is contained in the 90 per
cent confidence interval of the SI model, except for rows 3 and 4. With respect to inflation, the
mode of RMSE(π) according to the SI model is in all cases inside of the 90 per cent confidence
interval of the LII model. Therefore, even though the differences in the modes of the RMSE
statistic for inflation and output are consistent across the robustness analysis, they are in general
not statically significant.
Different information structure for the Sticky information model. This section con-
cludes with the analysis of different assumptions about the type of agents who confront informa-
tion frictions. The vast majority of studies that estimate the sticky information model assume
that only firms are subject to a slow diffusion of information. Table 4 shows few of these studies,
and their findings. This assumption is equivalent to constrain the values of γsih and γ
si
w equal to
zero. The estimation of the SI model with only inattentive firms is shown in row 8 of table 2.
As we can see by the JT statistic, the data rejects at a 5 per cent significance the assumption
that only firms suffer information frictions. In terms of the goodness of fit, the constrained SI
model has a poorer performance for all variables, as shown by row 8 in table 3. In the same vein,
assuming that consumers and workers face information frictions, while firms have full informa-
tion (thus, γsip = 0) is rejected by the data at a 10 per cent of significance (table 2, last row).
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Finally, assuming that firms and consumers are inattentive, while workers are fully informed
(thus, γsiw = 0), is barely tolerated by the data (the p-value of the JT -stat in table 2, row 9, is
equal to .11). This alternative assumption makes the SI model more inaccurate with respect to
the baseline in all variables, as shown by table 3, row 9. Thus, in order to match the behavior
of output, inflation, wage inflation, and the fed funds, the SI model requires that all agents in
the economy be subject to information frictions.
6 Discussion
Given the evidence provided in the last section, it is hard to choose between the LII model and
the SI model as the environment that represents a closer description of reality. This difficulty is
do to the fact that the dynamics after a shock in monetary policy are not significantly different
between models. As a result, one may ask whether there are other dimensions that can give us
arguments to differentiate between models.
6.1 Microeconomic evidence about the frequency of price changes
One of these dimensions might be given by microdata studies that aim to characterize the fre-
quency of price changes. The evidence for U.S. is the following. Bils and Klenow (2004) and
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) show that 50 per cent of prices change in 4 months or less. On
the other hand, this result depends on whether sale prices are taken into account, as Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) point out. Removing sales increases the median duration between price
changes to 7 or 9 months. On the other hand, the real question is whether sales should ac-
tually be excluded from this kind of studies, and the answer is not obvious. Sales should be
filtered out if they behave as orthogonal movements to macroeconomic variables. We might
ask then, do sales react differently than regular prices to macroeconomic innovations? An an-
swer is provided by Klenow and Willis (2007), who find that sale price changes are at least as
sensitive to inflation as regular price changes are. As a result, sales may not be filtered out of
the analysis or, at least, we should try to understand exactly what kind of information sales have.
Now assume that each of the model price reoptimizations can be interpreted as price readjust-
ments or changes. Further, neglect for the moment any aggregation issues that might stop us
from comparing microdata evidence about the frequency of price changes with the macroeco-
nomic perception of price readjustments. If we would like to link the prediction of price changes
according to one of the models, we would have to conclude that the LII model is in accordance to
the evidence of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), while the SI model is in line with the evidence
of Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Willis (2007). The reason is that the LII model
predicts that prices are reoptimized on average once per year, whereas the SI model predicts
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that prices are reoptimized every quarter, but firms react to old information. Evidently, the
models described in Section 2 do not distinguish between regular and sale prices, and yet it
appears that the information contained in sales might help in choosing one of the two models
as more accurate representation of macroeconomic dynamics.
6.2 Different shocks and the real wage
Another dimension which may assess the differences between the LII and the SI models, is to
investigate how each model reacts to other shocks that do not refer to monetary policy. For
instance, we can consider a neutral-technology shock and a government-spending shock. For the
former, we can assume that every intermediate-good producer is subject to a common produc-
tivity disturbance. In addition, we can assume that, in the steady state, the ratio of government
purchases to GDP is equal to 19 per cent in the resource constraint. The latter equals the
historical ratio in the U.S. for the last 10 years. Further, we can assume that both shocks fol-
low AR(1) processes, with persistence values calibrated as in Smets and Wouters (2007) (thus,
ρa = .95 and ρg = .97 for technology and government purchases, resp.). Figures 4 and 5 show
the models’ responses to a positive shock in technology and a 1 per cent increase of GDP in
government purchases.
In terms of the technology shock, the SI model predicts a smaller boom in output and consump-
tion than the LII model, while the dynamics of inflation are very similar. Also noticeable, is
that the peak effect in wage inflation is reached several quarters later in the SI model than in
the LII model. The most remarkable difference, though, relies on the responses of the real wage.
Even though the latter reacts less strongly than output in both models (in terms of percentage
deviations from the steady state), the SI model predicts a higher volatility in the real wage than
the LII model. Now let us see if this prediction is also true for a demand-side shock.
When government purchases increase by 1 percent of GDP, the SI model predicts that consump-
tion is not crowded out as much as in the LII model. This prediction implies that the responses
of output are slightly more pronounced under the SI model. Once again, inflation somehow has
similar dynamics in both models, and again, the peak effect of wage inflation under the SI model
happens a few quarters after the one predicted by the LII model. Finally, it the real wage is
again smoother under the LII model than under the SI model.
It thus appears that the dynamics of the real wage may contain further information that will
help to choose one of the two models as a better description of aggregate dynamics. Lately, Liu
and Phaneuf (2007) and Riggi and Tancioni (2010) investigated the effects of technology shocks
on real wages. Their inquiries may help to close the race between the two models described in
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this paper. However, this point is left for further research.
7 Concluding remarks
The present study considers two alternative devices that aim to explain the persistent behavior
of output and inflation that have been documented after a shock in monetary policy. A baseline
model, that considers price and wage rigidities a` la Calvo plus other real rigidities, is added
with two specifications that create intrinsic persistence to macro variables. The first one adds
habit formation to consumption decisions, plus a lagged inflation indexation rule for firms and
workers that are unable to reoptimize their prices and wages in a certain period. The second
specification adds sticky information to households, firms, and workers, thus assuming that there
is a pervasive slow diffusion of information that applies to all the population. Both models are
then compared to the estimated aggregate responses to a monetary policy shock resulting from
a monetary SVAR for the U.S., using the sample period 1960(1)-2007(2).
The analysis finds that, in general, the lagged inflation indexation model has a modest advantage
for predicting output, whereas for inflation is the pervasive sticky information model that has a
slightly better performance. These differences, however systematic on the robustness analysis,
are not sufficiently great to imply any statistical significance in terms of the goodness of fit
of each model, measured by the root mean squared error. Further, the estimated version of
the sticky information model suggest that inattentive firms may replace entirely sticky prices
as an explanation of price-setting behavior. For wages, the conclusion is less robust. Finally,
the results also suggests that the best environment to study sticky information models is one
in which all type of agents face information frictions. Assuming that only firms are inattentive
is rejected by the data. In addition, assuming that either firms or worker are attentive and
thus that information stickiness is not pervasive, results in a poor goodness of fit of the sticky
information model.
In terms of the evidence reported herein, is difficult to decide whether a researcher should pick
one of the two models in order to study inflation and output inertia. Trying to link the predic-
tions of the two models with microeconomic evidence about the frequency of price changes does
not help much either. The reason is that the lagged inflation indexation model is in line with
the evidence of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), which points out that prices change once per
year. This result is due the fact that these authors do not include sale prices in their sample. On
the other hand, the pervasive sticky information model is in line with the evidence of Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Willis (2007), which suggest that prices change every quarter
but react to old information. These results are due to these authors including sale prices in their
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analysis. Whether sale prices should be included is a subject of controversy in the field, since
Klenow and Willis (2007) report that sale prices react as much as regular prices to changes in
inflation.
Finally, Section 6.2 reviews the responses of each model to other non-monetary shocks. The
main difference relies on the dynamics of the real wage, where the pervasive sticky information
model predicts a more volatile response than the lagged inflation indexation model. Therefore,
real wages might contain some information that could help us to discriminate between the two
models. This hypothesis is left for future research.
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Figure 1: The monetary SVAR, shock to monetary policy
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Figure 2: Fit of sticky information and lagged inflation indexation
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Figure 3: RMSE for the bootstrapped baseline estimation
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Figure 4: Aggregate responses to a technology shock
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Figure 5: Aggregate responses to a government spending shock
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Table 1. Estimated results for the lagged inflation indexation model.
γh γp γw αp αw api ay ρe σν JT
Baseline .81
(.13)
[.55, .99]
1
(−)
[.78, 1]
1
(−)
[0.64, 1]
.74
(.19)
[.22, .89]
.84
(.11)
[.61, .99]
1.41
(−)
[1, 2.34]
0
(−)
[0, .56]
.92
(.04)
[.83, .98]
.18
(.02)
[.13, .20]
52.09
[.39]
Labor supply
elasticity, ω−1w = .1
.82
(.13)
[.54, .99]
.98
(−)
[.71, 1]
1
(−)
[0.61, 1]
.77
(.21)
[.22, .89]
.77
(.15)
[.13, .93]
1.42
(−)
[1, 2.24]
0
(−)
[0, .95]
.92
(.04)
[.81, .98]
.18
(.02)
[.13, .20]
51.63
[.38]
Risk aversion, σ = .5 .88
(.09)
[.70, .99]
1
(−)
[.80, 1]
1
(−)
[0.65, 1]
.77
(.18)
[.27, .88]
.81
(.13)
[.57, .99]
1.43
(−)
[1, 2.14]
0
(−)
[0, .20]
.91
(.06)
[.81, .97]
.18
(.02)
[.13, .20]
48.77
[.42]
Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator, ǫµ = 0
.82
(.14)
[.55, .99]
1
(−)
[.80, 1]
1
(−)
[0.65, 1]
.87
(.21)
[.32, .94]
.84
(.13)
[.58, .99]
1.41
(−)
[1, 2.14]
0
(−)
[0, .20]
.92
(.08)
[.80, .97]
.18
(.02)
[.13, .20]
52.09
[.39]
Linear production
function, φ = 1
.81
(.14)
[.55, .99]
1
(−)
[.56, 1]
1
(−)
[0.65, 1]
.42
(.25)
[0, .83]
.85
(.11)
[.60, .67]
1.39
(−)
[1, 2.44]
0
(−)
[0, .16]
.91
(.05)
[.82, .98]
.18
(.02)
[.12, .20]
52.36
[.40]
CBO output gap .88
(.09)
[.67, .98]
1
(−)
[.89, 1]
1
(−)
[0.52, 1]
.74
(.14)
[.48, .85]
.77
(.12)
[.54, .98]
1.47
(−)
[1, 2.27]
0
(−)
[0, .51]
.92
(.04)
[.83, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.13, .20]
63.55
[.25]
Alternative VAR ident.,
fed funds rate moves first
.90
(.11)
[.64, .97]
1
(−)
[.63, 1]
1
(−)
[0.63, 1]
.84
(.14)
[.51, .95]
.90
(.11)
[.66, .99]
1.84
(−)
[1, 2.47]
0
(−)
[0, .30]
.94
(.04)
[.85, .97]
.19
(.02)
[.14, .22]
84.62
[.14]
Note : The standard deviation of the parameter estimate is shown in parenthesis, and the 90 per cent confidence interval is in brackets. When
these measures are not provided, an interval starting at one of the extremes of the parameter space and ending at its 80 percentile is shown in
brackets. For the JT statistic, the p-value of the null JT = 0 is shown in brackets.
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Table 2. Estimated results for the sticky information model
γh γp γw αp αw api ay ρe σν JT
Baseline .90
(.10)
[.64, .98]
.66
(.11)
[.53, .78]
.79
(.23)
[.32, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .32]
0
(−)
[0, .75]
1.29
(−)
[1, 2.81]
0
(−)
[0, .08]
.91
(0.04)
[0.83, 0.97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .20]
62.53
[.26]
Labor supply
elasticity, ω−1w = .1
.89
(.10)
[.64, .98]
.71
(.14)
[.42, .81]
.75
(.20)
[0.35, .99]
.44
(−)
[0, .47]
0
(−)
[0, .69]
1.47
(−)
[1, 2.67]
0
(−)
[0, .07]
.92
(.04)
[.84, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .19]
62.04
[.28]
Risk aversion, σ = .5 .95
(.05)
[.82, .99]
.69
(.10)
[.58, .78]
.78
(.24)
[.29, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .13]
0
(−)
[0, .75]
1.39
(−)
[1, 2.66]
0
(−)
[0, .08]
.92
(.04)
[.83, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .19]
62.40
[.26]
Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator, ǫµ = 0
.90
(.09)
[.67, .98]
.82
(.12)
[.60, .86]
.76
(.20)
[.35, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .43]
0
(−)
[0, .76]
1.29
(−)
[1, 2.90]
0
(−)
[0, .28]
.91
(.04)
[.83, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .20]
61.79
[.28]
Linear production
function, φ = 1
.90
(.10)
[.64, .98]
.59
(.15)
[.37, .77]
.78
(.22)
[.32, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .37]
0
(−)
[0, .71]
1.28
(−)
[1, 2.75]
0
(−)
[0, .09]
.91
(.04)
[.83, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .19]
61.30
[.40]
CBO output gap .95
(.06)
[.79, .99]
.62
(.12)
[.48, .78]
.77
(.25)
[.28, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .26]
0
(−)
[0, .77]
1.56
(−)
[1, 3.09]
0
(−)
[0, .15]
.93
(.04)
[.84, .97]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .19]
75.78
[.19]
Alternative VAR ident.,
fed funds rate moves first
.95
(.09)
[.72, .99]
.77
(.15)
[.48, .86]
.84
(.25)
[.34, .99]
0
(−)
[0, .45]
.12
(−)
[0, .77]
1.38
(−)
[1, 3.89]
0
(−)
[0, .08]
.93
(.04)
[.87, .98]
.19
(.02)
[.14, .22]
85.44
[.11]
Attentive consumers and
workers, γh = γw = 0
0 .60
(.11)
[.49, .72]
0 .31
(−)
[.0, .41]
.54
(.18)
[.27, .85]
4.36
(−)
[1.53, 5]
.06
(−)
[0, .09]
.98
(.08)
[.72, .99]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .18]
267.57
[.02]
Attentive workers,
γw = 0
.89
(.10)
[.67, .99]
.78
(.11)
[.62, .87]
0 .09
(−)
[.0, .67]
0.63
(.16)
[.34, .88]
1.78
(−)
[1, 3.11]
.08
(−)
[0, .20]
.94
(.04)
[.85, .99]
.17
(.02)
[.12, .19]
199.33
[.11]
Attentive firms,
γp = 0
.95
(.06)
[.81, .99]
0 .79
(.19)
[.16, .85]
.04
(−)
[0, .33]
0.29
(−)
[0, .74]
1.09
(−)
[1, 2.58]
0
(−)
[0, .27]
.90
(.05)
[.82, .98]
.18
(.02)
[.13, .21]
105.85
[.09]
Note : The standard deviation of the parameter estimate is shown in parenthesis, and the 90 per cent confidence interval is in brackets. When
these measures are not provided, an interval starting at one of the extremes of the parameter space and ending at its 80 percentile is shown in
brackets. For the JT statistic, the p-value of the null JT = 0 is shown in brackets.
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Table 3. Goodness of fit, in terms of the RMSE*1000
Sticky information Lagged inflation indexation
yt πt π
w
t it yt πt π
w
t it
Baseline 103.7
[78, 217]
11.7
[7, 20]
11.8
[8, 21]
10.9
[7, 24]
78.6
[60, 229]
13.8
[9, 25]
12.7
[8, 22]
9.7
[6, 22]
Labor supply
elasticity, ω−1w = .1
95.5
[71, 215]
12.6
[8, 20]
12.2
[7, 20]
10.8
[7, 23]
80.0
[60, 225]
14.0
[9, 25]
12.9
[8, 23]
9.3
[6, 22]
Risk aversion, σ = .5 101.2
[77, 213]
11.7
[7, 20]
11.9
[8, 21]
11.7
[7, 23]
73.1
[59, 236]
13.6
[9, 24]
13.05
[8, 22]
10.8
[7, 24]
Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator, ǫµ = 0
100.0
[78, 218]
13.1
[8, 22]
11.9
[8, 21]
10.3
[6, 23]
77.1
[60, 233]
14.0
[9, 26]
12.3
[8, 23]
9.4
[6, 24]
Linear production
function, φ = 1
99.5
[75, 216]
11.8
[7, 19]
11.9
[8, 21]
10.4
[7, 24]
79.8
[61, 237]
13.4
[9, 26]
12.2
[8, 23]
9.4
[6, 26]
CBO output gap 76.6
[60, 148]
12.4
[7, 20]
11.7
[8, 20]
11.0
[7, 22]
64.0
[54, 140]
14.5
[9, 24]
12.7
[8, 22]
11.6
[7, 22]
Alternative VAR ident.,
fed funds rate moves first
130.5
[93, 240]
22.2
[15, 34]
17.0
[11, 27]
11.2
[8, 23]
114.2
[76, 223]
25.6
[18, 40]
16.8
[12, 28]
11.0
[8, 26]
Attentive consumers and
workers, γh = γw = 0
160.1
[93, 279]
17.7
[12, 32]
21.1
[14, 35]
25.1
[16, 45]
- - - -
Attentive workers,
γw = 0
122.9
[82, 237]
13.5
[8, 21]
26.0
[14, 40]
12.0
[7, 25]
- - - -
Attentive firms,
γp = 0
127.0
[86, 236]
17.4
[12, 28]
11.4
[7, 21]
11.5
[9, 24]
- - - -
Note : The 90 per cent confidence interval around the median of the root mean squared error is shown in brackets.
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Table 4. Selected estimations of Sticky information.
Eq. framework Do the authors compare to .... ?
General.
Pervasive ?
Partial Sticky Prices Inflation index Dual stickiness Quantitative method Quarters between info.updates
{firms, workers, households}
Andre´s et al. (2005)
√
No
√
Maximum likelihood {6.7,−,−}
Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2009)18
√
No
√ √ √ MDE on
sample covariances
{5,−,−}
Duport et al. (2008)
√ √ √ √ MDE on
inflation variance
{1.4,−,−}
Mankiw and
Reis (2006)
√
Yes
MDE on
sample covariances
{1.9, 1.5, 2.8}
Mankiw and
Reis (2007)
√
Yes
Bayesian {1.4, 5.1, 5.4}
Khan and Zu (2006)
√ Non-linear LS on
VAR forecasts
{3 to 7,−,−}
Kiley (2007)
√ √ √
Maximum likelihood {1.7,−,−}
Korenok (2008)
√ √ √
Bayesian {3.3,−,−}
Knotek (2008)
√ √ MDE on observed
Phillips curve
{6.7,−,−}
Reis (2009)
√
Yes
Bayesian {1.9, 1.4, 12.5}
Table 2, row 1
√
Yes
√ √ √ MDE on monetary
policy shock
{3.0, 4.8, 10.0}
18Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009) consider a model with four types of firms: pure sticky price, pure sticky information, rule-of-thumb, and flexible-price firms.
In their baseline estimation, they found out that pure sticky information firms account for 21 per cent of the total, and that these firms update information on
average every 20 quarters. Since 79 per cent of firms gather new information every quarter, the weighted average of information updating is 4.99 quarters.
42
